Rahman Yaacob

Jakarta carries risks while seeking the rewards of its friends to all approach to defence diplomacy.

Published 27 Aug 2024

Indonesia is indeed a friend to all. Shortly after the Indonesian President-elect and Defence Minister Prabowo Subianto finalised a defence agreement with Australia, Indonesian Army Chief of Staff General Maruli Simanjuntak announced a plan over the weekend to conduct a bilateral military exercise with China in 2025.

Australia should not be alarmed. The drills with China might be seen to undermine the significance of the soon-to-be-signed defence agreement between Canberra and Jakarta, particularly given the hype surrounding Prabowo’s visit last week to Canberra. But it is essential to understand the grounds for Indonesia’s decision with China.

The move is reflective of Indonesia’s strategic culture, of emphasising non-alignment in dealings with major powers, maintaining defence engagements with various partners, and avoiding military alliances. Indonesia also welcomes deeper defence engagements with the Americans, shown by the 2024 Garuda Shield Exercise this year involving the United States, the largest ever held. Indonesia, as chair of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations in 2023, also drove the first joint ASEAN military exercise, which did not involve any external party.

The timing of Simanjuntak’s announcement is significant, too, coming a few days after Prabowo visited Canberra. Perhaps it was Jakarta’s way of reassuring Beijing that the Australia-Indonesia defence agreement is just business-as-usual as far as Indonesia’s defence diplomacy goes.

But Indonesia must also be cautious in advancing defence ties with China. Such moves might be misunderstood. Here, two issues are critical – the nature and location of the exercise.

A high-level combat military exercise focusing on conventional security and interoperability – such as seizing of airfield or amphibious landing operations, the kind of activities featured in Garuda Shield – would do more than raise eyebrows across Southeast Asia and beyond. Yet most exercises with China by ASEAN members are small in scale and scope, focusing on non-traditional security areas. So the more likely question will be, who is the target of “interoperability” between Indonesia and China?

Exercises that focus on “interoperability” seek to establish a high level of convergence across military doctrine and via the integration of communication and weapon systems. Will the Americans be comfortable with the Indonesians using American weapon systems or platforms in the exercise with Chinese forces? Most likely not. Thailand’s experience is illustrative – the Thais could not deploy its American-made F-16s to participate in the Blue Strike air exercises series with China.

Suppose the Indonesians persist in deploying American-made weapon systems or platforms despite Washington’s reservation. In that case, Washington would likely hesitate to provide Jakarta with advanced weapon systems and technology transfers in the future. Other like-minded American allies, such as France, Germany and South Korea, may follow suit, thus impacting Prabowo’s ambitions to modernise the Indonesian armed forces.

The location of the proposed exercise will also be closely watched by Indonesia’s neighbours, with sensitivity over maritime boundary disputes the South China Sea. Equally, an exercise with Chinese troops close to Australia will raise concerns in Canberra.

Thus, Indonesia under Prabowo must carefully consider the potential repercussions of closer defence relations with Beijing. Being a friend to all can risk been seen as a friend to none.