{Solar panel prices, for example, have fallen by 95 per cent since China entered the industry two decades ago. Prices of lithium iron phosphate (LFP) batteries for EVs have halved in the past year and are expected to halve again this year. No amount of subsidies could have made this happen. The real story is China’s innovation and scale.
The West did not complain about China’s overcapacity in the past because it was good for them. When Chinese companies were mainly making parts and products for global companies, their overcapacity meant customers could squeeze prices and fatten profit margins. Now that Chinese companies want to make and sell their own products, these easy margins are gone.
And as Chinese companies rise up the value chain in the global market, a clash of business cultures is shaping up between the West and China.
Unlike the cutthroat competition of a century ago, the big capitalists of the West meet in Davos and are not above colluding to limit competition. For too long, product prices have tended to go up; profits have been stable or rising. Corporate managers have been able to pay themselves enormous sums and become rich enough to join the global governing elite.
But today’s Chinese capitalists, including the local governments that back them, are more like the Western capitalists of a century ago, when overcapacity, price wars and government backing were common in the West. These Chinese capitalists want to crush their competition, not coexist over a bottle of wine. Terrified Davos capitalists are therefore demanding protectionist tariffs.}
Western protectionism will fail – China’s success isn’t down to subsidies
Complaints of Chinese overcapacity and dumping may be useful in justifying US, EU subsidies and trade barriers but China’s success is really due to its innovation and scale
The strategy will only lead these high-cost Western economies to pay the price with slower growth and higher indebtedness down the road
The global economy is moving further towards a world of two prices as the West prop up their green technological industries with subsidies and protectionist tariffs against the cheaper products made by the Global South.
But this strategy will only lead these high-cost Western economies to pay the price with slower growth and higher indebtedness down the road. Meanwhile, the Global South, with its lower costs, will enjoy faster growth and healthier finances.
US Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen has just been to China to complain about its overcapacity, subsidies and dumping in the global market. Plainly, this attack is aimed at justifying America’s use of subsidies and tariffs as well as non-tariff barriers to protect its nascent green tech industry.
Under the Inflation Reduction Act, for instance, US makers of batteries for electric vehicle (EVs) can claim a tax credit of US$45 per kWh. In China, EV battery prices are already expected to fall through US$45 per kWh this year, thanks to intense competition. But the issue of dependence on China’s supply chain has become politically toxic in the US, so American subsidies will continue.
Some have been surprised that the US is not focusing on its exchange rate to boost its competitiveness, as it has done before. In 1971, it ditched the gold standard and devalued the dollar by about one third, as the Japanese yen and Deutschmark strengthened. After the 1985 Plaza accord to depreciate the dollar, the US currency weakened by half against these currencies.
The US is not devaluing its dollar now because its debt and deficit levels are very high. Should the dollar halve its value against the yuan, for instance, the resulting inflation will sharply force up interest rates, triggering a debt crisis. A revalued yuan would also mean a much bigger Chinese economy, likely to be larger than America’s. How would that be in America’s interests?
The US economic strategy seems to depend on attracting money globally to feed its deficit spending and sustain its high costs. It would allow the US to have its cake and eat it too, maintaining support for domestic industries that require huge financial help, such as the semiconductor and green tech sectors.
Many emerging economies have gone down this route, offering protection for domestic businesses in the hope that their success would raise the economy. But all too often, the result was crony capitalism, which caused inflation and low growth, trapping people in poverty. The same outcome could befall the US and Europe.
This is not to brush aside China’s overcapacity, which has been around for two decades. Government subsidies exist in China as they do in other countries, but this is not the reason for China’s success.
Solar panel prices, for example, have fallen by 95 per cent since China entered the industry two decades ago. Prices of lithium iron phosphate (LFP) batteries for EVs have halved in the past year and are expected to halve again this year. No amount of subsidies could have made this happen. The real story is China’s innovation and scale.
The West did not complain about China’s overcapacity in the past because it was good for them. When Chinese companies were mainly making parts and products for global companies, their overcapacity meant customers could squeeze prices and fatten profit margins. Now that Chinese companies want to make and sell their own products, these easy margins are gone.
And as Chinese companies rise up the value chain in the global market, a clash of business cultures is shaping up between the West and China.
Unlike the cutthroat competition of a century ago, the big capitalists of the West meet in Davos and are not above colluding to limit competition. For too long, product prices have tended to go up; profits have been stable or rising. Corporate managers have been able to pay themselves enormous sums and become rich enough to join the global governing elite.
But today’s Chinese capitalists, including the local governments that back them, are more like the Western capitalists of a century ago, when overcapacity, price wars and government backing were common in the West. These Chinese capitalists want to crush their competition, not coexist over a bottle of wine. Terrified Davos capitalists are therefore demanding protectionist tariffs.
25:55
Biden is freezing out China’s tech industry
Biden is freezing out China’s tech industry
One may argue that China, cut off from some markets, would collapse first, ridding the West of Chinese competition. But that is likely to be wishful thinking. Low prices tend to create their own demand. China’s trade in low-priced tech is likely to help many Global South economies break the so-called middle-income trap and this could lead to a self-sustaining boom.
The good news is the East-West tensions are not likely to trigger a military war, as many businesses and investors fear. Recent developments in the Middle East and Ukraine have shown that the US does not have the resources to support a big war. Even if the US wanted an arms race with China, it would need to double, even triple, its defence budget – money it doesn’t have.
The bad news, however, is that the trade war is going to be much worse. In 1987, US Congressional leaders smashed Japanese electronics on Capitol Hill with sledgehammers. It is a matter of time before they do the same to Chinese solar panels and EVs – but first, they need to find some US-made sledgehammers.
Andy Xie is an independent economist
{Solar panel prices, for example, have fallen by 95 per cent since China entered the industry two decades ago. Prices of lithium iron phosphate (LFP) batteries for EVs have halved in the past year and are expected to halve again this year. No amount of subsidies could have made this happen. The real story is China’s innovation and scale.
The West did not complain about China’s overcapacity in the past because it was good for them. When Chinese companies were mainly making parts and products for global companies, their overcapacity meant customers could squeeze prices and fatten profit margins. Now that Chinese companies want to make and sell their own products, these easy margins are gone.
And as Chinese companies rise up the value chain in the global market, a clash of business cultures is shaping up between the West and China.
Unlike the cutthroat competition of a century ago, the big capitalists of the West meet in Davos and are not above colluding to limit competition. For too long, product prices have tended to go up; profits have been stable or rising. Corporate managers have been able to pay themselves enormous sums and become rich enough to join the global governing elite.
But today’s Chinese capitalists, including the local governments that back them, are more like the Western capitalists of a century ago, when overcapacity, price wars and government backing were common in the West. These Chinese capitalists want to crush their competition, not coexist over a bottle of wine. Terrified Davos capitalists are therefore demanding protectionist tariffs.}
Western protectionism will fail – China’s success isn’t down to subsidies
Complaints of Chinese overcapacity and dumping may be useful in justifying US, EU subsidies and trade barriers but China’s success is really due to its innovation and scale
The strategy will only lead these high-cost Western economies to pay the price with slower growth and higher indebtedness down the road
The global economy is moving further towards a world of two prices as the West prop up their green technological industries with subsidies and protectionist tariffs against the cheaper products made by the Global South.
But this strategy will only lead these high-cost Western economies to pay the price with slower growth and higher indebtedness down the road. Meanwhile, the Global South, with its lower costs, will enjoy faster growth and healthier finances.
US Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen has just been to China to complain about its overcapacity, subsidies and dumping in the global market. Plainly, this attack is aimed at justifying America’s use of subsidies and tariffs as well as non-tariff barriers to protect its nascent green tech industry.
Under the Inflation Reduction Act, for instance, US makers of batteries for electric vehicle (EVs) can claim a tax credit of US$45 per kWh. In China, EV battery prices are already expected to fall through US$45 per kWh this year, thanks to intense competition. But the issue of dependence on China’s supply chain has become politically toxic in the US, so American subsidies will continue.
Some have been surprised that the US is not focusing on its exchange rate to boost its competitiveness, as it has done before. In 1971, it ditched the gold standard and devalued the dollar by about one third, as the Japanese yen and Deutschmark strengthened. After the 1985 Plaza accord to depreciate the dollar, the US currency weakened by half against these currencies.
The US is not devaluing its dollar now because its debt and deficit levels are very high. Should the dollar halve its value against the yuan, for instance, the resulting inflation will sharply force up interest rates, triggering a debt crisis. A revalued yuan would also mean a much bigger Chinese economy, likely to be larger than America’s. How would that be in America’s interests?
The US economic strategy seems to depend on attracting money globally to feed its deficit spending and sustain its high costs. It would allow the US to have its cake and eat it too, maintaining support for domestic industries that require huge financial help, such as the semiconductor and green tech sectors.
Many emerging economies have gone down this route, offering protection for domestic businesses in the hope that their success would raise the economy. But all too often, the result was crony capitalism, which caused inflation and low growth, trapping people in poverty. The same outcome could befall the US and Europe.
This is not to brush aside China’s overcapacity, which has been around for two decades. Government subsidies exist in China as they do in other countries, but this is not the reason for China’s success.
Solar panel prices, for example, have fallen by 95 per cent since China entered the industry two decades ago. Prices of lithium iron phosphate (LFP) batteries for EVs have halved in the past year and are expected to halve again this year. No amount of subsidies could have made this happen. The real story is China’s innovation and scale.
The West did not complain about China’s overcapacity in the past because it was good for them. When Chinese companies were mainly making parts and products for global companies, their overcapacity meant customers could squeeze prices and fatten profit margins. Now that Chinese companies want to make and sell their own products, these easy margins are gone.
And as Chinese companies rise up the value chain in the global market, a clash of business cultures is shaping up between the West and China.
Unlike the cutthroat competition of a century ago, the big capitalists of the West meet in Davos and are not above colluding to limit competition. For too long, product prices have tended to go up; profits have been stable or rising. Corporate managers have been able to pay themselves enormous sums and become rich enough to join the global governing elite.
But today’s Chinese capitalists, including the local governments that back them, are more like the Western capitalists of a century ago, when overcapacity, price wars and government backing were common in the West. These Chinese capitalists want to crush their competition, not coexist over a bottle of wine. Terrified Davos capitalists are therefore demanding protectionist tariffs.
25:55
Biden is freezing out China’s tech industry
Biden is freezing out China’s tech industry
One may argue that China, cut off from some markets, would collapse first, ridding the West of Chinese competition. But that is likely to be wishful thinking. Low prices tend to create their own demand. China’s trade in low-priced tech is likely to help many Global South economies break the so-called middle-income trap and this could lead to a self-sustaining boom.
The good news is the East-West tensions are not likely to trigger a military war, as many businesses and investors fear. Recent developments in the Middle East and Ukraine have shown that the US does not have the resources to support a big war. Even if the US wanted an arms race with China, it would need to double, even triple, its defence budget – money it doesn’t have.
The bad news, however, is that the trade war is going to be much worse. In 1987, US Congressional leaders smashed Japanese electronics on Capitol Hill with sledgehammers. It is a matter of time before they do the same to Chinese solar panels and EVs – but first, they need to find some US-made sledgehammers.