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DISCUSSION
Lawsuits against persons sued for exercising their constitutional right to free speech "in connection with a public issue shall be subject to a special motion to strike, unless . . . the plaintiff has established that there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim." (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) We review de novo a trial court order on an anti-SLAPP motion. (Oasis West Realty, LLC v. Goldman(2011) 51 Cal.4th 811, 820.) Where the trial court has denied an anti-SLAPP motion, we first determine whether the defendant "demonstrate[d] that the act or acts of which the plaintiff complains were taken `in furtherance of the [defendants'] right of petition or free speech . . . in connection with a public issue,' as defined in the statute." (Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53, 67.)
Defendants argue their comments were made in a public forum in connection with an issue of public interest: the Yang litigation. (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(3).) Assuming Yeyeclub constitutes a "public forum," this contention fails because defendants have not demonstrated their statements were made "in connection with an issue of public interest." Courts broadly construe the phrase "public interest" (see Cross v. Cooper (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 357, 372) but defendants present no coherent argument, no persuasive authority, and no evidence supporting their contention that the Yang litigation was an issue of public interest. (See Abuemeira v. Stephens(2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1291, 1298 [no evidence establishing "the dispute was anything other than a private controversy"].) Defendants' statements arose out of a private business dispute between competing Web sites. Defendants' anti-SLAPP motion supports this conclusion: in their motion, defendants characterized the dispute as arising out of their refusal to modify their "business practices" for Yue. "[A] defendant in an ordinary private dispute cannot take advantage of the anti-SLAPP statute simply because the complaint contains some references to speech . . . by the defendant." (Martinez v. Metabolife Internat., Inc. (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 181, 188.) We conclude defendants' statements did not "concern a person in the public eye, conduct that could directly affect large numbers of people beyond the participants, or a topic of widespread public interest." (D.C. v. R.R. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 1190, 1230.)2
This case does not, as defendants claim, come within "section 425.16, subdivision (e)(2), which includes statements made in connection with civil court litigation." (Seltzer v. Barnes (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 953, 962.) A "`statement is "in connection with" litigation under section 425.16, subdivision (e)(2), if it relates to the substantive issues in the litigation and is directed to persons having some interest in the litigation.'" (Ibid.) There is no evidence defendants' statements were directed to individuals with an interest in the Yang litigation. Defendants' reliance on Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1106 is unavailing. Briggs held "a defendant moving to strike a cause of action arising from a statement made before, or in connection with an issue under consideration by, a legally authorized official proceeding need not separately demonstrate that the statement concerned an issue of public significance." (Id. at p. 1123.) Briggs has no application here.
Because defendants failed to make the required showing on the first step of the section 425.16 analysis, we do not reach the second step. (City of Cotati v. Cashman(2002) 29 Cal.4th 69, 80-81.) We conclude the trial court did not err by partially denying defendants' anti-SLAPP motion.
DISPOSITION
The order partially denying defendants' anti-SLAPP motion is affirmed. Yue is awarded costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a).)
Simons, J. and Needham, J., concurs.
