The historical echo from those times may have contributed to the misunderstanding of China’s common prosperity push, even though in the reform era since 1978, non-state-owned sectors have been encouraged and have played a big role in China’s growth.

Thus, many foreign commentators have conflated China’s recent regulation of internet giants, which is a completely separate issue, with the goal of common prosperity and misrepresented the tension between entrepreneurs and the government.

The Economist, for example, said in October 2021 that, “Deng Xiaoping, one of Mr Xi’s predecessors, famously said that he did not care if cats were white or black as long as they caught mice. Mr Xi’s main opinion about cats is that he does not like them fat.”

In fact, governments around the world grapple with regulation of internet giants and enforcement of antitrust laws. China’s internet giants have been described as spoiled playground bullies for unfair practices such as forcing small businesses to pick one of the two major platforms.

The clampdown on them is about ensuring fair competition and sustainable growth, and has no connection with the much broader goal of common prosperity.

Also, while officials encourage charitable giving – which is referred to in China as the third or tertiary distribution of income – such donations and contributions are voluntary. This simply reflects the government’s effort to improve the distribution system.

Common prosperity is not a new concept. In fact, the Communist Party is merely inheriting and continuing a historical mission. Some foreign critics have taken Deng’s theory of “get rich first” out of context, thereby cutting the historical link of Xi’s policy with that of his predecessors.

These are the commentators who say the new focus on common prosperity marks a significant policy shift, or that Xi is returning to more socialist principles.

On the contrary, the Communist Party has been consistent in its pursuit of common prosperity.

“Common prosperity and socialism have never disappeared from the Chinese Communist Party’s official statements,” Cao Jinqing, a sociologist who worked at East China University of Science and Technology in Shanghai told me.

The term “common prosperity” made its first appearance in a party document on agricultural production co-operatives in 1953. Aiming to improve agricultural productivity, Mao Zedong said the party should organise peasants using socialist rural reform, shifting from small-scale private production to mass collective production so that peasants can gradually eliminate poverty and achieve common prosperity.

After Deng took power in the late 1970s, he led the Chinese people in blazing a new trail in socialism with Chinese characteristics. To boost economic development, he took a step-by-step approach towards achieving common prosperity.

He envisioned allowing some people and regions to get rich first, then letting these regions help the others gradually achieve prosperity.

Millions of Chinese have got rich first over the past 40 years. Yet, income disparity has also grown in tandem, a significant worry both to the party and the people.

Thus, Xi’s mission now is to achieve the ultimate goal of common prosperity – helping those who are lagging behind to share in China’s growing prosperity.

Income disparity poses a widespread challenge to China and many other countries, including developed economies. The party has pledged to deal with it, not just because it is political commitment, but also because common prosperity is an aspiration of the vast majority of the Chinese people.

Last year, the Chinese language version of BBC News quoted a British politician as saying, “The only thing that the Communist Party of China fears is Chinese people. Not the US or the UK, but just Chinese people.” This has become something of a joke on Chinese social media. But the quote contains a grain of truth about the relationship between the Chinese people and the party.

In some countries, the solution to a social crisis could be a change of leadership through an election.

In China, where people’s satisfaction is the top priority under the leadership of the Communist Party, the sole ruling party, the outcome of a societal crisis could be the collapse of the government, and even the party, if social tensions get out of control.

The Communist Party has clearly realised that income inequality could be a driving force for such a crisis and undermine support for the regime as a whole.

According to Cao, “Historically, in the last century, successive revolutions in China were all related to the equalisation of wealth.”

Beijing is walking a fine line. “It is a mission with which the Chinese Communist Party can win support from the people,” Cao said. “It is also another test of the party’s governance: to neither demoralise the rich, nor encourage laziness.”

Yanping Gao is a researcher at Maku Insights think tank and co-author of the book “Why China Again”. Lilian Zhang, a researcher at Maku Insights, also contributed to this article