'First, China is pursuing hegemony in East Asia, but not an exclusive hostile hegemony. It is not trying to extrude the United States from the region or deny American access there. The Chinese have long recognized the utility—and the benefits to China itself—of U.S. engagement with the region, and they have indicated receptivity to peaceful coexistence and overlapping spheres of influence with the United States there. Moreover, China is not trying to impose its political or economic system on its neighbors, and it does not seek to obstruct commercial freedom of navigation in the region (because no country is more dependent on freedom of the seas than China itself). In short, Beijing wants to extend its power and influence within East Asia, but not as part of a “winner-take-all” contest.'
'A standard counterargument to this relatively benign scenario is that Beijing would not be content with it for long because China’s strategic ambitions will expand as its capabilities grow. This is a valid hypothesis, but it usually overlooks the greater possibility that China’s external ambitions will expand not because its inherent capabilities have grown, but because Beijing sees the need to be more assertive in response to external challenges to Chinese interests or security. Indeed, much of China’s “assertiveness” within East Asia over the past decade—when Beijing probably would prefer to focus on domestic priorities—has been a reaction to such perceived challenges. Accordingly, Beijing’s willingness to settle for a narrowly-defined, peaceable version of regional preeminence will depend heavily on whether it perceives other countries—especially the United States—as trying to deny China this option and instead obstruct Chinese interests or security in the region.'
'American primacy in East Asia has often been characterized in terms of the United States serving as the guarantor of regional security, protecting the “global commons” and providing “public goods” there. The U.S. alliance network in the region certainly extends an umbrella of protection to those countries with which Washington has defense pacts; and its military freedom of navigation operations signal an intention to resist excessive Chinese maritime claims. But even U.S. allies do not perceive that China is being deterred in the South and East China Seas. More broadly, it is not clear what other public goods the United States is actually providing in the East Asian commons. For example, commercial shippers in the Western Pacific do not presume or rely on the protection of the U.S. Navy—which doesn’t have the fleet to provide it. And Washington’s withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership has undermined the idea of U.S. leadership in the region on behalf of shared economic interests.'
'...It’s not 1945 anymore, or even 1991. The United States sought and maintained a preponderance of power during the Cold War, but this almost certainly is not permanently sustainable, either globally or within East Asia. American primacy in the Western Pacific was a historical anomaly, and sooner or later the United States will have to get used to a regional role that is something less than that.
'Moreover, policies and strategies aimed at upholding U.S. primacy in East Asia are likely to be counterproductive because such an approach, probably more than anything else, would reinforce Beijing’s belief that the United States seeks to contain China by keeping it subordinate within its own region. This would increase the chances of Beijing feeling compelled to adopt a more confrontational and aggressive posture. Chinese pursuit of a more exclusive hostile hegemony could thus become a self-fulfilling prophecy.'
'But Washington should not approach this competition on the basis of outdated assumptions—including the belief that U.S. primacy in East Asia can and should be perpetually sustained (an obsolete world view), a misunderstanding or mischaracterization of China’s regional ambitions, or a miscalculation of the United States’ own power and leverage. Washington should accept that strategic competition is unavoidable and absolute security is not possible. It should also recognize that even U.S. allies and partners in the region are already operating within overlapping American and Chinese spheres of influence—and they prefer this to being forced to choose between Washington and Beijing.'
https://nationalinterest.org/blog/skeptics/rethinking-us-primacy-east-asia-40972
[First, China is pursuing hegemony in East Asia, but not an exclusive hostile hegemony. It is not trying to extrude the United States from the region or deny American access there. The Chinese have long recognized the utility—and the benefits to China itself—of U.S. engagement with the region, and they have indicated receptivity to peaceful coexistence and overlapping spheres of influence with the United States there. Moreover, China is not trying to impose its political or economic system on its neighbors, and it does not seek to obstruct commercial freedom of navigation in the region (because no country is more dependent on freedom of the seas than China itself). In short, Beijing wants to extend its power and influence within East Asia, but not as part of a “winner-take-all” contest.]
[A standard counterargument to this relatively benign scenario is that Beijing would not be content with it for long because China’s strategic ambitions will expand as its capabilities grow. This is a valid hypothesis, but it usually overlooks the greater possibility that China’s external ambitions will expand not because its inherent capabilities have grown, but because Beijing sees the need to be more assertive in response to external challenges to Chinese interests or security. Indeed, much of China’s “assertiveness” within East Asia over the past decade—when Beijing probably would prefer to focus on domestic priorities—has been a reaction to such perceived challenges. Accordingly, Beijing’s willingness to settle for a narrowly-defined, peaceable version of regional preeminence will depend heavily on whether it perceives other countries—especially the United States—as trying to deny China this option and instead obstruct Chinese interests or security in the region.]
[American primacy in East Asia has often been characterized in terms of the United States serving as the guarantor of regional security, protecting the “global commons” and providing “public goods” there. The U.S. alliance network in the region certainly extends an umbrella of protection to those countries with which Washington has defense pacts; and its military freedom of navigation operations signal an intention to resist excessive Chinese maritime claims. But even U.S. allies do not perceive that China is being deterred in the South and East China Seas. More broadly, it is not clear what other public goods the United States is actually providing in the East Asian commons. For example, commercial shippers in the Western Pacific do not presume or rely on the protection of the U.S. Navy—which doesn’t have the fleet to provide it. And Washington’s withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership has undermined the idea of U.S. leadership in the region on behalf of shared economic interests.]
[...It’s not 1945 anymore, or even 1991. The United States sought and maintained a preponderance of power during the Cold War, but this almost certainly is not permanently sustainable, either globally or within East Asia. American primacy in the Western Pacific was a historical anomaly, and sooner or later the United States will have to get used to a regional role that is something less than that.
Moreover, policies and strategies aimed at upholding U.S. primacy in East Asia are likely to be counterproductive because such an approach, probably more than anything else, would reinforce Beijing’s belief that the United States seeks to contain China by keeping it subordinate within its own region. This would increase the chances of Beijing feeling compelled to adopt a more confrontational and aggressive posture. Chinese pursuit of a more exclusive hostile hegemony could thus become a self-fulfilling prophecy.]
[But Washington should not approach this competition on the basis of outdated assumptions—including the belief that U.S. primacy in East Asia can and should be perpetually sustained (an obsolete world view), a misunderstanding or mischaracterization of China’s regional ambitions, or a miscalculation of the United States’ own power and leverage. Washington should accept that strategic competition is unavoidable and absolute security is not possible. It should also recognize that even U.S. allies and partners in the region are already operating within overlapping American and Chinese spheres of influence—and they prefer this to being forced to choose between Washington and Beijing.]
