Government should ban Chinese group from supplying network ‘core’

The editorial board

January 20 2020

Whether to allow China’s Huawei to participate in Britain’s 5G networks is one of the most important decisions Boris Johnson’s government will take. Superfast next-generation communications will underpin the “internet of things”, smart cities, self-driving cars, even telemedicine. That, in turn, will create entirely new vulnerabilities to spying and sabotage. In striving to fulfil its aim to be a global 5G leader, the government must weigh the costs of delay against vital security considerations.

There are geostrategic implications, too. The US is threatening to limit intelligence-sharing with Britain in the Five Eyes alliance, which also includes Australia, Canada and New Zealand, if it allows Huawei a 5G role. Washington’s concerns that Chinese companies could be used for spying predate Donald Trump’s presidency. The UK, however, must take decisions based on its overall national interest. It should stick to last year’s provisional decision to allow Huawei a role in the radio “periphery” of networks — antennas and masts in which it claims a technological lead — but bar it from the “core” which manages the network.

Britain’s telecoms operators have worked on that basis since the Chinese group started supplying equipment in the UK more than 15 years ago. While Huawei strenuously denies it would ever allow itself to be used by Beijing, the UK’s National Cyber Security Centre has long assumed the Chinese state “could compel anyone in China to do anything”. Its focus has been on mitigating the risk.

The argument against extending the status quo is that 5G technology blurs the old distinctions. The core no longer sits in a central box but is virtual, composed of software spread across the network. Reducing signal delays to support time-critical functions such as self-driving vehicles means more computing must take place near the periphery. 5G requires a forest of small transmitters, all vulnerable. Malcolm Turnbull, who as Australia’s prime minister banned Huawei entirely from 5G networks in 2018, warned 5G’s “virtualised” technology made it impossible to separate the core from the periphery.

Witnesses in UK parliamentary hearings last year said the distinction would still be valid in Britain, however; geographical differences meant its networks would be designed differently from Australia’s. UK intelligence leaders, two parliamentary committees and industry executives say the risks of Chinese companies’ involvement in 5G periphery can be managed. Indeed, a diverse supply chain generally makes networks more resilient to technical and security problems.

The first wave of 5G, moreover, will be built on top of existing 4G infrastructure. Banning Huawei from even the periphery would force operators to rip its equipment out of current networks — causing disruption, expense and delay — and wait for other suppliers to catch up with its technology. On various estimates, 5G rollout could be delayed by two to several years, reducing the broader economic benefits and holding back the UK tech industry.

Some intelligence officials dissent from their bosses’ sanguine attitude, warning 5G networks will eventually be so complex that managing the risks of Chinese involvement will overwhelm resources. The government should therefore give Ofcom, the regulator, stronger powers to hold telecoms operators to the toughest security standards in network design. Huawei’s involvement even in 5G periphery should be conditional on rapidly addressing concerns over its cyber security standards raised by a testing centre based in Banbury. But the costs of a full ban are too high to justify.

https://www.ft.com/content/0a733368-3b97-11ea-b232-000f4477fbca